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In the Supreme Court
olthe Stale ol Utah
FRANKLIN D. RICHARDS,
Plaintiff and Appellant,

vs.

Case No.
8970

ROBERT A. ANDERSON,
Defendant and Respondent,

APPELLANT'S BRIEF

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
We shall refer to the parties as they appeared in the
court below. All emphasis by the Appellant.
This action was initially commenced in the City Court
of Salt Lake City, Utah, where the court sitting without al
jury, rendered judgment for the plaintiff. The defendant
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appealed to the District Court, where at pretrial, summary
judgments were given to the defendant on plaintiff's complaint and to the plaintiff on defendant's counterclaim.
Plaintiff's subsequent motion to amend findings of fact,
vacate the judgment and for new trial, was denied. The
plaintiff appeals frdm the denial of said motion and from
the district court's summary judgment for the defendant
on plaintiff's complaint.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Since the court below rendered a summary judgment
adverse to plaintiff, he is entitled to have the facts viewed
in the light most favorable to him in this appeal. ( Abdulkadir vs. Western Pacific Railroad Co., 7 Ut., (2d) 53, 318 Pac.
(2d) 339). Appellant's evidence would establish the facts to
be as follo-ws:
The two-car accident took place at the "T" intersection of 5th South and University Streets, Salt Lake City,
Utah, on March 6, 1957 at approximately 8:00 a.m. Fifth
South at this point is a through highway, designated as
U. S. 40, and is 88 feet wide with three lanes of traffic in
each direction, separated by a concrete island. (R. 5, 6,
diagram). The inside west-bound lane was 10 feet wide,
the center west-bound lane was 10 feet wide, and the outside west-bound lane was 23 feet wide. (Diagram). The
posted speed limit on Fifth South at the point of collision
was 40 miles per hour. (R. 7). University Street is 23 feet
wide and has a stop sign facing north. (R. 5, diagram).
The morning of the accident, the weather was overcast,
and it had been raining, but at the time of the collision
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there was no precipitation.
Plaintiff was proceeding west on Fifth South on the
inside lane at 15 miles per hour approaching the intersection of University Street. (R.l5,plaintiff's affidavit). The
center and outside west bound traffic lanes were well filled
with other moving vehicles, which completely blocked
plaintiff's view as to any traffic proceeding onto Fifth South
from University Street. (Plaintiff's affidavit). The defendant stopped at the stop sign on University Street and proceeded south onto Fifth South in front of moving westbound traffic in the center and outside lanes of traffic,
attaining a speed of five to ten miles per hour. (R. 5, 7).
Defendant intended to make a left turn around the dividing island and proceed east on Fifth South. (The defendant
entered the intersection prior to the entrance of the plaintiff into the intersection proper. (R. 7).
The plaintiff first noted the sudden appearance of the
defendant's car just a few feet in front of him in plaintiff's lane of traffic and plaintiff immediately applied his
brakes. At about the same instant the defendant saw plaintiff and attempted to stop. (R. 5, 7, plaintiff's affidavit).
The two cars collided at a point five feet south of the line
separating the inside and center west-bound traffic lanes
and ten feet west of an extension of the east border of
University Street where it intersects Fifth South. (R. 5,
diagram). There were no visible skid marks on the road.
(Diagram). The vehicles moved approximately two feet
southwest after impact. (Plaintiff's affidavit). A Salt Lake
Police Officer investigated the accident and prepared a
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diagram of the scene of the accident. (Diagram). Immediately after the collision the defendant stated to the
plaintiff, "I am sorry, it appears to have been my fault."
(Plaintif's affidavit, R. 8).
It should be noted that there is no evidence before
the court regarding the following relevant and material
facts: The relative positions and speed of other traffic in
the vicinity of the accident just prior to the accident; the
condition of the brakes and windshields on the two vehicles involved; the exact time of and type of brake application by the parties; more exact physical circumstances
bearing on the ability of either party to see one another
prior to the time that each of them actually saw one
another; familiarity of the parties with the intersection;
how long defendant was stopped prior to moving onto
Fifth South Street; exact position of the stop sign; position of the defendant when stopped at the stop sign; the
time differential between the parties in entering the intersection; the speed and movement of the defendant in crossing Fifth South prior to the collision; the n1ovement of
west-bound traffic abreast of the plaintiff relative to the
movement of the parties; the full testimony of both parties,
one eye-witness and the investigating police officer. All
of this could and should be supplied, and it is the contention of appellant that if all of the available evidence were
presented, there would be questions of fact to be determined by a jury. On the record before the trial court, the
rights of the parties cannot be determined as a matter of
I a w.
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STATEMENT OF POINT TO BE RELIED UPON
THERE WAS NOT SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE BEFOR THE LOWER COURT TO RULE THAT THE
PLAINTIFlF, AS A MATTER OF LAW, WAS GUILTY
OF NEGLIGENCE, OR THAT ANY SUCH ALLEGED
NEGLIGENCE WAS A PROXIMATE CAUSE OF
PLAINTIFlF'S DAMAGE.
ARGUMENT

Construing the evidence and inferences therefrom
most favorably to the plaintiff, as this court is bound to
do, the situation may be viewed as follows:
The plaintiff, proceeding west on Fifth South, was
reducing his speed and going at the rate of 15 miles per
hour in approaching the intersection at University Street.
The defendant, without warning, going at the rate of 10
miles per hour, suddenly appeared in front of the plaintiff
from in front of traffic to the right of the plaintiff which
completely obstructed plaintiff's view. (Plaintiff's affidavit). The defendant had stopped at the stop sign on
University Street and waited for a period of time that
caused him to become impatient for the crowded westbound traffic to give him an opening to cut across the six
lane through highway. Finding a slight break in the westbound traffic, the defendant seized the opportunity, and
drove out onto Fifth South, although he could not see, or
failed to see, the traffic approaching on the inside westbound lane on which plaintiff was slowly proceeding. It
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may be also assumed, upon the the basis of plaintiff's
proposed testimony, that the west-bound traffic to the
right of the plaintiff was proceeding at such a speed, and
in such relative positions that said traffic was able to
have advance warning of the movement of the defendant,
and therefore avoid collision with the defendant. (Plaintiff's affidavit). It is not disputed that the defendant was
negligent. In summary, plaintiff alleges that in addition
to the stipulated facts, a full presentation of the evidence
would disclose other facts, presenting a total picture
from which a jury could conclude that:
1. The defendant should have seen the plaintiff prior
to the time the defendant actually did so and yielded the
right of way to the plaintiff.
2. The plaintiff had no reason or opportunity to anticipate the presence of the defendant before the plaintiff
actually did so.
3. Under all the circumstances the plaintiff was not
negligent and the sole proximate cause of the accident
was the defendant's negligence.
The sole question before this court is as to whether,
as a matter of law, the plaintiff was negligent, and if any
such alleged negligence was the proximate cause of plaintiff's damage.
The question in,·olves Section 41-6-74, U.C.A.
1953, which peovides:
"Vehicle entering a through highway. The
driver of a vehicle shall stop as required by this
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act at the entrance to a through highway and shall
yield the right-of-way to other vehicles which have
entered the intersection from said through highway
or which are approaching so closely on said through
highway as to constitute an immediate hazard, but
said driver having so yielded may proceed and the
drivers of all other vehicles approaching the intersection on said through highway shall yield the
right-of-way to the vehicle so proceeding into or
across the through highway.
"(b) The driver of a vehicle shall likewise stop
in obedience to a stop sign as required herein at
an intersection where a stop sign is erected at one
or more entrances thereto although not a part of
a through highway and shall proceed cautiously,
yielding to vehicles not so obliged to stop which
are within the intersection or approaching so closely as to constitute an immediate hazard, but may
then proceed."
The lower court apparently based its Summary
Judgment primarily upon the case of Smith vs. Lenzi, 74
Ut. 362, 279 Pac. 893. The facts of that case are distinguishable. It did not involve obstructions to the vision of the
two involved drivers, occurred on a dark night, involved
a much different type of intersection, and different movements by the parties prior to the collision. In that case,
the lower court entered judgment based on a jury verdict
for the motorist proceeding on the through street. This
court reversed the lower court on the grounds that the
jury failed to receive proper instructions on the relative
rights of the involved motorists. This court then proceeded
not to rule on the liability as a matter of law, but rather
to instruct the lower court on the proper applicable law
at 279 Pac. 895, 896, as follows:
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"If the respondent (approaching the through
street) stopped immediately before entering Highland Drive, he complied with all the requirements
of the ordinance. From that moment he was free
to move without restriction, so far as the ordinance
is concerned. As he approached Highland Drive
after stopping, the statute gave him the right-ofway as against automobiles coming in the direction
the respondent was traveling, and made it the duty
of such persons approaching from the left to yield
the right-of-way. But these rights and duties were
only relative, and must be applied in the light of
the conditions existing at the time. Aside from any
statute or ordinance, it was the duty of both parties
to use such caution as a reasonably prudent person
would have done in entering the intersection. The
speed that the cars were approaching, their distance
from the point of intersection, the ability of the
respective drivers to see were all factors to be considered by the jury in determining whether appelant or respondent was entitled to the right-of-way.

" ... When a person stops immediately before
entering an arterial highway, he will necessarily
enter the intersection more slowly. The rate that
he is moving, the speed of the arterial traffic, and
its frequence, together with any other surrounding
circumstances, must all be considered, together
with the statute giving to the person approaching
from the right the right-of-way in determining
whether at a given instance he should enter the
stream of traffic."
The holding and dicta of Smith vs. Lenzi, as applied
to the instant case require only that a court properly
instruct a jury on the statutory law, in order that the jury
may apply said law in the full light of the existing conditions. The plaintiff seeks nothing more than this. In the
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instant case neither the facts before the lower court at
the pretrial, nor the additional facts alleged by the plaintiff, will justify a finding that as a matter of law the
plaintiff was negligent or that any such alleged negligence
was the proximate cause of his damage. It may be noted
that whatever support the defendant's position may receive
from the Smith case is challenged in a vigorous dissent by
two of the justices in that case, and in the more recent
holdings of this court as reflected in intersection cases
hereinafter cited.
In Williams vs. Z.C.M.I., 312 Pac. (2d) 564, this court
commented upon the statute involved in the instant case
as follows:
"The statute requires the driver entering a
through highway to yield the right of way to other
vehicles which have entered into the intersection
from the through highway or which are approaching so closely on said through highway as to constitute an immediate hazard.
({A fact question was presented as to whether
defendant entered the intersection when plaintiff
was approaching so closely on said through highway as to constitute an immediate hazard. The
further fact question was presented, as to whether
defendant had entered the intersection under such
circumstances as to impose on plaintiff the duty
of yielding the right-of-way."

Construing the stipulated and alleged facts most favorably to the plaintiff in the instant case, an obvious fact
question is presented as to whether the plaintiff was approaching so closely to the intersection as to constitute an
immediate hazard to the defendant.
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Regarding the question of determining contributory
negligence this court stated in Martin vs. Stevens, 243
Pac. (2d) 741, at pages 749-50:
"The question of contributory negligence is
usually for the jury and the court should be reluctant to take consideration of this question of fact
from it. * * * The right to trial by jury should be
safeguarded. Before the issue of contributory negligence may be taken from the jury, the defendant's
burden of proving both (a) that plaintiff was guilty
of contributory negligence, and (b) that such negligence proximately contributed to cause his own
injury, must be met, and established with such
certainty that reasonable minds could not find to
the contrary; conversely, if there is any reasonable
basis, eitheT because of lack of evidence, or from
the evidence and the fair inferences arising therefrom, taken in the light most favorable to plaintiff,
upon which reasonable minds 1nay conclude that
they are not convinced by a preponderance of the
evidence either (aj) that plaintit,f was guilty of contributory negligence or (b) that such negligence
proximately contributed to cause the injury, the
plaintiff is entitled to have the question submitted
to a jury.

"* * *An excellent text statement of the rights
and duties of drivers at intersections is contained
in 2 Blashfield Cyclopedia of Automobile Law and
Practice, Perm. Ed. § 991 to 994 incl. pp. 206 et
seq. The first of these rules is that the vehicle
which enters the crossing first has the right-of-way
over a second one con1ing from another direction,
unless under the standard of due care, he should
not proceed because to do so would hazard a collision. In close cases, this test is somewhat unsatisfactory because of the difficulties, after a collision
has occurred, of detern1ining who had the right-of
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way on that basis. The text just referred to correctly states: '* * * The mere fact of reaching the intersection first is no longer recognized as the sole
test as to who has the right of way. In order for
a driver to claim the right of way on the basis of
entering the intersection first, it must appear that
he did not speed up just for the purpose of claiming the right of way, and also that the margin or distance by which he claimed it was so clear as to be
without doubt.' "
The court also quoted with approval the following
language of Justice Wolfe from Bullock vs. Luke, 98 U.
501, 98 Pac. (2d) 350, 354:

"* * * we must be careful not to stretch contributory negligence to the point where we make
it incumbent upon one not only to drive carefully
himself, but to drive so carefully as always to be
prepared for some sudden burst of negligence of
another and be able to avoid it. * * *"
The lower court in the instant case has evidenced
not the slightest inclination to be "reluctant" to take
contributory negligence from a jury or to avoid "stretch
ing" said doctrine.
The citing of additional similar cases with varying
fact situations would be of little help to this court.
A summary judgment is proper only if the pleadings
and admissions show that there is no genuine issue of
material fact, and that the moving party is entitled as
a matter of law to such judgment. (U.R.C.P. 56 C; Martin
vs. Stevens, supra; Abdulkadir vs. Western Pacific Railroad Co., supra). The fact that the history of this case
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shows that one judge hearing fully the case without a
jury found for the plaintiff, and that a second judge,
viewing only a part of the facts and allegations, summarily
reached a contrary result, strongly indicates that this case
is one upon which reasonable men may differ as to any
negligence on the part of plaintiff and the proximate
causes of the collision.
CONCLUSION
The recent decisions of this court clearly hold that in
nearly all intersection cases the question of defendant's
negligence and plaintiff's contributory negligence are for
the jury. Hess vs. Robinson, 109 Ut. 60, 163 Pac. (2d) 510;
Lowder vs. Holley, 120 Ut. 231, 233 Pac. (2d) 350; Poulsen
vs. Mannes, 121 Ut. 269, 241, Pac. (2d) 152; Martin vs.
Stephens, supra; Kalaher vs. Brown, 6 Ut. (2d) 346, 313
Pac. (2d) 804.
The summary judgment for the defendant should be
reversed and a new trial ordeTed in plaintiff's cause of
action.
Respectfully submitted,
MORETON, CRISTENSEN & CHRISTENSEN
& JAY E. JENSEN

Attorneys for Appellant
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